S/P/246. Conventional Paradigm and the Acquisition of Knowledge: "In areas of knowledge such as the arts and the sciences, do we learn more from work that follows or that breaks with accepted conventions?"

The paper examines how knowledge is acquired in the areas of knowledge (AOK) such as science, art and economics. Paradigms of knowledge acquisition and the methods of its application in different AOK are discussed touching on the role of conventions and the outcomes of braking conventions.

S/P/134. Does our knowledge of arithmetic depend on our notions of space and/or time?

The paper examines Kant's philosophy of maths arguing whether arithmetical judgements depend on space or time. Kant's understanding of the notion of intuition and the 'syntheticity' of arithmetical knowledge is discussed; Russell's objections to Kant's account of arithmetic are reviewed.

S/P/117. Analysis of the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental

This paper deals with the central tenet of Davidson's theory of mind - anomalous monism. The principle of the anomalism of the mental states, that there is no systematic relation between mental and physical events. The paper considers Davidson's arguments for the claim that there are no strict psychophysical or psychological laws; I consider a variety of powerful objections to this claim, and argue that none are successful. The paper gives a clear exposition of extremely complex material, and provides detailed analysis of the positions and arguments involved.

S/P/106. Can DescartesÌ Dualism account for the human faculty of sensation?

This essay argues against Descartes' dualistic notion of the human being as being made up from two distinct substances (the mind a complete thinking and non-extended substance, and the contingent extended body). The critic will focus on the fact that Descartes' dualism cannot account for the human faculty of sensation. For sensation cannot be termed as either a mode of just the mind, or mode of just the body, but such a faculty will be shown to belong to the modes of both body and mind.

P/P/323. Wittgenstein's criticism of Augustine's theory of language acquisition

The paper addresses the issues of language acquisition reviewing the ideas expressed by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations' that challenge Augustine's theory of language. Approaches to learning as a development of naming techniques in children are discussed.

S/P/89. What are laws of nature and do they have any relevance in a modern epistemological framework in the philosophy of science?

This essay examines laws of nature and whether they have any role to play in modern science. So ingrained is this idea that the world around us is modelled upon these laws, it is all too easy to forget what is meant by them, if indeed they even exist in any genuine sense. Are they simply the equations we learn from textbooks, or inescapable universal truths? Many have argued that laws are something beyond even this. The essay discusses these suggestions, but endorses Van Fraassen’s argument, which suggests that in our current metaphysical framework there is little to suggest laws can play a relevant role, if indeed they exist at all.

S/P/83. What is the role of rationality in the explanation of action?

This essay analyses and evaluates the extent to which rational choice theory can explain human behaviour. The literature generally agrees on the point that rationality must at least have some role to play in determining explanations for our actions. The debate arises over the nature and scope of this role. Can actions be explained by rationality alone? This essay argues that to espouse such a position would be questionable and almost certainly wrong, whilst hopefully maintaining the reasoning for why rational choice must still be considered in analysing our actions. As such, the key drawbacks of rational choice theory are discussed, along with attempts by some to adopt holistic rational choice approaches.

S/P/82. Can scientific theories be true? Are there credible alternatives to scientific realism?

This paper examines the case for scientific realism – whether scientific theories can be ‘true’. It first attempts to provide a clearer definition of what is meant by scientific realism, before going on to consider the notable arguments made in favour of such an idea (particularly those of Putnam and Boyd). There is then detailed criticism of the idea, particularly surrounding the fundamental assumptions, and some suggestions of alternatives. Van Fraassen’s ‘approximate truth’ idea is also examined.

S/P/81. Can the social sciences be value neutral?

The paper examines the nature and possibility of objectivity in the sciences; both natural and social. It has been argued that in order to be established as a truly scientific project the social sciences must also fulfil a commitment to objectivity. There is much scepticism as to whether disciplines like economics and sociology can consist entirely of the assertion of facts, and many argue that they are inevitably tainted by value judgements. In this essay, it is argued that the possibility of a value free social science is a highly unlikely one, but this is not necessarily a problem undermining the academic credence of it. Whilst values may necessarily pervade the social sciences, this does not inevitably mean that such studies are of no scientific interest and possess no objective measure, as the disciplines may yet remain value neutral, if not value free. Furthermore, the role of values in natural science is very ambiguous.

S/P/80. What is the role of observation in the foundation or justification of scientific knowledge?

This paper examines the role observation plays (or is able to play) in developing a firm foundation for scientific knowledge. It discusses the ‘protocol statements’ conception put forward by supporters of logical positivism, and its attempt to provide a firm foundation for the natural sciences. There is then a detailed outline of Popper’s critique of these ideas, and further explanation as to why the role of observation is grounding science is likely to be limited at best.

S/P/79. Are scientific explanations to be given in causal terms?

This paper examines the role of causality in scientific explanation, and discusses how our intuitive attachment to its involvement should not be confused with thinking we can adequately describe the connection. It examines numerous models suggesting that causation forms an essential basis for explaining scientific phenomena, identifying the key weakness as an unconvincing treatment of causal relations. There is also an examination and rejection of adopting a nihilistic approach, i.e. denying that science should have any explanatory role.

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