I received an MA (Hons) in International Relations and Modern History from one of Britain's leading universities in June 2002. This provided the basis upon which I commenced my postgraduate career, completing an M.Phil in Transatlantic Studies (for which I received a Distinction) in June 2004 and I am currently in the final stages of writing my doctoral thesis on US foreign policy. My research areas vary greatly within the disciplines of International Relations and Political Science and I have been internationally recognised by governmental and presidential libraries and foundations within the US.

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Is the European Union sui generis or can it be used as a model for regional integration outside of Europe?

In an article examining nationalism within Europe, Anthony Smith observes that the European Union (EU) represents the very model of regional integration; fostered by “an unprecedented balance of wealth and well-being … and the search for … an open society”, historical and contemporary processes of enlargement provide the EU with a capacity to consolidate upon its own integrative experiences and advance comparable endeavours elsewhere (Smith: 1993). Given a “proliferation of new regional groups and … a revival of older regional bodies” the popularity of this sentiment endures (Fawcett: 1995). Yet as William Wallace argues, the European paradigm demonstrates a collection of “peculiar circumstances” that precludes its universal application (Wallace: 1995).

Academic literature on regional integration justifiably recognises the accomplishments of the European Union; as Wallace observes, the EU represents the “only experiment in formal, institutionalised integration above the level of the nation-state to have survived and strengthened” (Wallace: 1994). This discussion will initially identify the conditions that promoted this successful integration and consider the continent’s institutional structure. The analysis will then isolate the implications of the European model upon regional integrative schemes within an Asian context.

Early examinations of European integration recognised its importance in contributing to regional integrative processes outwith its immediate vicinity; the successful union of Europe would supplement embryonic theories of regional integration and allow their “universal application in the future” (Haas: 1961). However, the conditions conducive to European integration were individual to the continent and remarkable for their ideological, historical, geographical and cultural perspectives.

The cumulative experience of the Second World War promoted a sentiment within Europe and the United States that recognised the failure of sovereign states in promoting peace and stability (Pierson: 1996). Consequently, the post-war construction of formal institutions within Europe reflected a belief in the efficacy of supranational governance (Wallace: 1994). Within this context, European integration pursued a threefold purpose: to reconstruct Europe’s economies and restore market mechanisms; to create a framework to promote reconciliation; and to secure regional cohesion (Wallace: 1994). However, the unique separation of politico-economic issues, via the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), from those of politico-military contributed to the conditions within which European integration developed. The security infrastructure provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allowed the economic integration of Europe to develop “without directly confronting the most difficult issues of internal balance or of external foreign and security policy” (Wallace: 1995).

Geographically, the concentration of capital, populations and resources within Western Europe contributed to the formal and informal integrative processes; the integration of individual, yet physically-adjacent, national economies and practices into a regional entity stimulated pressure for deepening integration of regulations and regimes. Correspondingly, the cultural heritage of Western Europe – demonstrated by an emergent commonality of values, liberal-democratic political practices and shared religions – eased the integrative processes (Wallace: 1994).

However, to argue that the integration of Europe was fostered by a philosophical rejection of the principle of state sovereignty, the historical precedent of war and a geographic and cultural convergence misrepresents the bona fide process. The presence of a benign United States’ hegemon within the European theatre significantly contributed to European integration. The United States’ provision of military capabilities allowed the economic reconstruction of Europe to proceed unencumbered. Similarly, the supply of capital to rebuild a Europe ravaged by war reinforces the extent to which the reconstruction and redirection of Europe was a construct – however direct or indirect – of the United States (Lundestad: 1998).

European integration was very much the product of unique circumstances, yet so too were, and are, its institutions and structures. The founding instruments of European integration created distinctive entities, each with designated responsibilities. They further specified the areas in which the communities held competence and clarified decision-making procedures (Wallace: 1994). Fundamental to the policy-making process was the “Monnet” or “Community method” of partnership between national and supranational forces. In institutional terms, this placed emphasis upon the negotiating and legislative functions of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers on the one hand and the policy initiating and brokering role of the supranational Commission on the other. The interaction between these two institutions was at the heart of the Monnet method. Supranationalism was also invested in the European Parliament, at its creation a largely advisory body, and the European Court of Justice. The community formula sought to balance supranational/European/technocratic impulses on the one hand with intergovernmental/ member-state/”political” tendencies on the other (Wallace: 1994).

European integration has evolved dramatically from its inception; membership has increased and will presently incorporate former Communist bloc states. Moreover, integration has deepened considerably. The Single European Act (SEA) (1986) stimulated the movement towards achieving a genuine single market among member-states whilst the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1992) produced criteria and a timetable for the realisation of monetary union (Lundestad: 1998). The TEU also saw the EU – as it became – moving into areas associated with “high” politics, notably foreign and security policy and co-operation in issues of justice and home affairs. Indeed, a broad approach towards the development of integration reveals a discernible accrual of governance at the European level, infringing upon the sovereign capacity of states to self-govern (Gordon: 1997). Not necessarily indicative of the obsolescence of the liberal-democratic state, such measures indicate that the EU is effectively more than an agreement among a collection of states to engage co-operatively in a project of economic liberalisation.

Consequently, the European Union is unique. Its creation and development is reflective of a composite of varying issues and circumstances particular to Europe. Whilst natural to assume that the success of the European Union offers a paradigm for integrative processes elsewhere in the world, these peculiar conditions preclude its application. The EU is the product of a very specific historical conjuncture and this explains both its format and its subsequent trajectory. The confluence of security, geopolitical, economic and ideological factors had much to do with the institutional design chosen for the European communities of the 1950s (Hurrell: 1995). The institutional architecture designed for a time-specific set of dilemmas has survived well beyond the resolution of those dilemmas. As the recent debate concerning the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003) demonstrates, the suitability of this architecture is incompatible with the current geopolitical, economic and security environment.

Regional integration necessarily implies the incorporation of physically contiguous economic, political and social units. However, whilst the EU and its historical predecessors exhibit this characteristic, the geographic expanse of Africa and Asia inevitably prohibits the fostering of integrative processes comparable to the EU (Foot: 1995). Moreover, a closer examination of Asian geopolitics exposes a fundamental divergence regarding the definition of “Asia”; this division is openly apparent in the contrast between the ideals of region implicit within Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), versus the assumed East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that persists in Asian membership of Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) (Higgott, Stubbs: 1995). The recent emergence and evolution of regionalism within Asia has been accompanied by ambiguity surrounding which “region” to consolidate upon or integrate. This debate encompasses questions of cultural and ideological values inherent within the demonstrated existence of de facto economic theatres (Palmer: 1991). Although typically dynamic, within Europe, these issues are contained within the dominant institutional entity of the EU.

Absent of the security-umbrella provided via NATO, European integration occurred within an essentially uniform organisation; however, Asian regionalism is demonstrably pluralistic. The existence of the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), APEC – and in broader terms, the South Pacific Forum (SPF) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – reinforces arguments that justifiably recognise the inefficacy of applying the European model of integration to the Asian region (Foot: 1995). The European integrative process demonstrated a degree of coherence and uniformity in its development anathema to comparable Asian initiatives.

The diverse collection of issues and obligations this pluralistic variety of regionalism represents contributes to its inherently informal institutional architecture. As Palmer rightly argues, Asian regionalism is explicitly state directed, interacting via a system of intergovernmental conferences and agreements (Palmer: 1991). APEC is governed by a Secretariat and operates through regular meetings of national officials and annual summits, its approach recognising the efficacy of consensus building, whilst ASEAN has sought to renew levels of trust amongst its constituents rather than construct arrangements predicated upon issues of “hard” security (Gershman: 2000; Dorsch, Mols: 1998).

As commentators have demonstrated, Asian integrative schemes characteristically exhibit modest ambitions in comparison to European integration; APEC proposes the elimination of trade and investment barriers between its constituents, without obtaining the monetary unity demonstrated by Europe, whilst ASEAN promotes peace and security initiatives within Asia correspondent with its founding instrument, the Bangkok Declaration (1967). European integration has typically concentrated upon economic and social issues, a capacity promoted by the separation of politico-economic and politico-military issues. However, it should be stressed that although the EU constituted a “civilian power”, engaged in economic and welfare issues, its ambiguity within the international theatre signifies that the EU constitutes “inescapably … a foreign policy project” (Bull: 1982). Whilst the tentative separation of economic and security issues within Asia is comparable to that demonstrated by Europe, the context within which it has developed is individual. The presence of the United States within Europe – acting as a benign hegemon – permitted this separation. However, Asian integrative endeavours have consciously pursued this approach, indicative of the pluralistic character of Asian regionalism.

It should be stressed that Asian integrative efforts are relatively nascent. The political economy of the theatre reflects the conclusion of the Cold War and the emergent trend towards globalisation. Whilst these circumstances share the “peculiar” marque accorded European integration, the European model was a product of the Cold War. Whilst its recent attempts to respond to the radically different geopolitical environment reflect a debate concerning its purpose and relevancy in the future, clear continuities are discernible within European integration both before and after the conclusion of the Cold War (Wallace: 1994).

Examinations of the European Union justifiably recognise its unique character and construction; as Wallace affirms, the EU was – and indeed, is – the product of a collection of “peculiar circumstances”. However, by definition, these conditions necessarily preclude the “universal application” of the European model alluded to by Haas.[1961] Whilst Asian attempts at integration inherently reflect a collection of circumstances individual to its theatre, it is here that comparative analyses of Asian and European regionalism end. European integration occurred amid an ideological confrontation that permitted the separation of politico-economic issues from politico-military, thanks to the presence of the United States within the European theatre. Whilst the EU in its current capacity – given its origins, evolution and institutional architecture – is sui generis, this character negates its efficacy in providing a model for integration outwith its theatre. However, the EU does possess the capability to act as a model; the recent Treaty Establishing a Constitution in Europe represents embryonic measures to reconcile the current geopolitical environment with the institutions that have sustained it. The successful ratification and application of the Constitution and its instruments represents a distinct opportunity for the EU to not only demonstrate its efficacy and renewed relevancy, but to provide the opportunity to act as a model for integrative processes elsewhere in response to changing strategic circumstances.

Bibliography

Articles
Bull, H., “Civilian Power Europe?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 21(ii) 1982
Dorsch, J. & Mols, M., “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements and Challenges”, Pacific Review, 11(ii) 1998
Gordon, P.H., “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy”, International Security, 22(iii) 1997
Gershman, J., “In Focus: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation”, Foreign Policy in Focus, 5(ixx) 2000
Haas, E.B., “International Integration: The European and Universal Process”, International Organisation, 15(iii) 1961
Higgott, R., & Stubbs, R., “Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC vs. EAEC in the Asia-Pacific”, Review of International Political Economy, 2(iii) 1995
Pierson, P., “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, 29(ii) 1996
Smith, A.D., “A Europe of Nations – or the Nation of Europe?”, Journal of Peace Research, 30(ii) 1993

Books
Fawcett, L. & Hurrell, A., (Eds.), Regionalism in World Politics, (Oxford: 1995)
Fawcett, L., “Regionalism in Historical Perspective” in Fawcett, L. & Hurrell, A., (Eds.)
Foot, R., “Pacific Asia: The Development of Regional Dialogue” in Fawcett, L. & Hurrell, A., (Eds.)
Lundestad, G., Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration 1945–1997, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
Palmer, N.D., The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific, (Lexington, MA.: The Free Press, 1991)
Wallace, W., “Regionalism in Europe: Model or Exception?” in Fawcett, L. & Hurrell, A., (Eds.)
Wallace, W., Regional Integration: The West European Experience, (Washington, D.C.: 1994)

Documents
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe