I am an experienced academic writer and researcher. I have studied in both Hong Kong and the UK at top academic institutions. Currently I am pursuing an MRes with a view to carrying my work through to complete a PhD in the field of Conflict Management and Development. In the past I have worked for a number of NGO’s and have spent a great deal of time working overseas in many different countries. My fields of expertise include Conservation, Public Policy, Politics, International Relations, Conflict and Development. I have also contributed to research into Culture, History and Travel.

How Successful is the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia as a Model for Building Peace After Civil Wars?

INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) cannot be used as a model for building peace after civil wars. Whilst there are many valuable lessons to be taken forward from Cambodia, the attempt to install an enduring liberal democratic system in a country with no tradition of democratic practices or liberalist ideas, in the short space of eighteen months, was naive and highly optimistic. Attempts therefore to establish transitional authorities on the Cambodian model, which try to move in a matter of months from a state of anarchic civil war to free and fair elections with a hope of establishing long-term peace and security, are unlikely to fulfil their objectives.

The lessons from the UNTAC experience, and the failures that prevent its use as a model for peace building after civil wars, are best understood through an analysis of the impact of the Transitional Authority on Cambodia’s long term political, economic and social stability. It is also important to include an analysis of the effect of the peace building mission on regional and international spheres. At each stage of this analysis the successes and failures of UNTAC will be evaluated and their impact on Cambodia’s credibility as a model highlighted. However none of the above analysis can be contextualised without a basic understanding of Cambodia’s recent history and the key terms of the argument.

The first of the key terms is the term model. What this means in terms of peace building traditions and whether the Transitional Authority in Cambodia is used as one, is key to understanding the importance of evaluating it in the light of the country’s long-term peace and stability. The word model when applied to peace building attempts to describe a ‘mainstreamed’ method, by which peace can be established and sustained in order to bring about stability in countries experiencing war ¹. Efforts to establish a singular protocol or model for building peace in war torn countries can be traced back to the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace. This was shortly followed by similar statements from international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with a view to establishing models by which to carry peace building to other countries ². All of these statements came out after Security Council Resolutions 668, 718 and 717 endorsing the UN and relevant development agencies commitment to the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict signed on the 23rd of October 1991 ³.

The importance of this timing is no coincidence as the peace building operation in Cambodia was the first time the international community had committed to a establishing a transitional authority on such a scale, and in a non-decolonising or secessionist state ⁴. Indeed the use of UNTAC as a model can be found in many works seeking to investigate normative approaches to peace building after civil conflict ⁵. It is therefore of great importance to understand what lessons can indeed be carried forward from UNTAC, and highlight areas where the Transitional Authority failed in order to avoid dangerous pit falls that could be presented by following it as a model for future operations.

Also of great importance is the already frequently used term, peace building. Peace building, unlike peace keeping, looks beyond the permanent cessation of hostilities and instead attempts to end conflict whilst also creating an environment and system from which long term stability can be built ⁶. Peace building includes establishing economic stability, stabilising social conditions, introducing proper political systems and legal structures as well as establishing peaceful coexistence ⁷. The Transitional Authority in Cambodia was a peace building project rather than a peace keeping one, as UNTAC was mandated to oversee foreign affairs, finance, public security, national defence and information to name just a few of the areas in which it was involved ⁸.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY
Any thorough analysis of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia and its applicability as a model for international peace building, must take into account its history. It is often a lack of understanding of Cambodia’s past that leads to attempts to homogenise the Cambodian experience into a single protocol for peace building after civil wars ¹².

There are two important periods of history that appear to weigh most heavily on Cambodia’s political and social conscience. The first is the Angkor period between the Ninth and the Fifteenth centuries AD. The Angkor Kingdom was centred in Cambodia’s North West and its presence and influence expanded over Laos, Thailand and Vietnam ¹³. During this period constant warring between different Khmer princes and powerful leaders as well as frequent conflict between the Angkor Kingdom and its neighbours defined the period as one of continual conflict ¹⁴. Despite this the nationalist pride for Khmers in the Angkor period has frequently been used by the Party for a Democratic Kampuchea (PDK or Khmer Rouge), the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP),  and the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC or H.R.H Sihanouk and H.R.H Ranariddh’s party) ¹⁵. These parties are the three key parties in Cambodian politics that were engaged in the civil war that ended with a ceasefire followed by the UN Transitional Authority. Indeed the behaviour of these parties, in line with their promises to restore the national pride of the Angkor period, very much mirrors the Angkor Kingdoms warring tradition ¹⁶.

The second most important period of history for an understanding of the Khmer people and the task facing UNTAC in Cambodia is the period after the deposition of Prince Sihanouk. Prince Sihanouk had ruled Cambodia under a centralized regime until 1970 when he was ousted in a bloodless coup by the Khmer Rouge. The genocide conducted by the Khmer Rouge resulted in between two and three million people dead or approximately one third of the population ¹⁷. In 1978 Vietnam staged a successful intervention forcibly removing the Khmer Rouge government and replacing it with the government of the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea in January 1979. At this point the UN became involved claiming the Vietnamese invasion had violated Article 2 of the UN Charter and upholding the Khmer Rouge government as the legitimate government of Cambodia ¹⁸. The period following the Vietnamese invasion can be characterised as one in which foreign powers such as the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and Thailand to name a few, provided aid and support to one of the three warring groups named above. These groups carried out a long and bloody civil war that ended in the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989 and a ceasefire agreement accepted in Jakarta in September 1990 ¹⁹.  The ceasefire agreement paved the way for the October 1991 Paris Peace Accords which outlined the peace building commitment of all sides in the conflict, and most importantly for the purpose of this analysis, the mandate on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ²⁰.

The importance of understanding the Angkor periods impact on Cambodian nationalism, and the impact of the post 1970 period, is paramount to understanding the context in which the UN Transitional Authority was attempting to install democratic peace and long term stability. As can be seen from the brief account of the countries two most important periods in history, the Cambodian state is very much built upon a warring tradition and has no history of democratic or liberal ideology ²¹. It therefore begins to become clear that the mandate of UNTAC, to conduct free and fair elections and put into place the necessary structures for long-term stability in just eighteen months, and its subsequent use as a model for peace building after civil wars, must be viewed with some caution.

MAP

Figure 1. UN Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section, Map No 3860 Rev 1

POLITICAL IMPACT OF UNTAC
To accurately analyse the success of UNTAC as a model for peace building after civil wars it is important to establish where it succeeded in Cambodia and where it failed. Through a thorough analysis of its accomplishments and its mistakes it then becomes possible to draw conclusions as to what lessons can be carried forward from the UNTAC experience. The first area to analyse in this manner is the political impact of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

Before continuing in this analysis however, a brief account of the scale of UNTAC’s mandate and conditions it faced upon its arrival is helpful to put its successes and failures into the context of the task. The political situation upon the arrival of UNTAC was one in which the three parties forces had agreed to a ceasefire, begun withdrawal of their forces into designated cantonment areas, and started the process of disarmament ²³. UNTAC was then faced with a mandate to determine which government agencies could affect elections and bring them under the independent and neutral control of UN staff, whilst also beginning the intensive process of moving the country toward elections ²⁴. This process was to include education programmes in the electoral and democratic process, organising the return of refugees and displaced persons so that they could take part in the electoral process, ensuring appropriate security measures were in place to allow Cambodians to vote free of coercion or violence, and establishing polling stations throughout the country to give the entire population access to vote ²⁵. The preparation and elections themselves were scheduled to be completed by the end of May 1993. After which the winning party was to establish an interim authority and a constitution ²⁶. Already the task mandated to UNTAC, given knowledge of Cambodia’s political parties violent past and the absence of democratic and liberal ideals in the country appears optimistic in the time frame.  The task of facilitating transition from an anarchic state of civil war to a viable non-violent democratic system given the long standing antagonism between the parties, undoubtedly required a long term commitment rather than a rigidly short timetabled approach ²⁷.

What also becomes apparent from the brief description of the UNTAC mandate above is that the election winner effectively took total victory. In Cambodia’s long and bloody civil war, the ultimate winner would be decided by the ballot box. Whilst the resolution of the conflict by peaceful means is admirable, this raised the elections stakes too high. Essentially, what was established was a ‘winner takes all’ election campaign through which one of the warring parties could gain their long desired outcome of power over the other two ²⁸. It is therefore of no great surprise that despite the success that must be accredited to UNTAC for successfully organising and conducting elections that were as free and fair as practically possible, this success was quickly undermined. Whilst the FUNCINPEC party won the election with fifty three of the one hundred and twenty seats in the government, the CPP refused to accept the results. Instead the CPP used threats to use its superior armed force and return to gun barrel diplomacy to regain a position of power. Prince Ranariddh, the FUNCINPEC leader, quickly bowed to CPP pressure and consented to form a coalition government with equal power sharing between the two parties ²⁹. Therefore despite UNTAC’s initial success, democratic processes had already been undermined without any intervention by UN personnel to uphold the will of the people expressed in the internationally heralded free and fair elections. This set a dangerous precedent for Cambodia’s political future ³⁰. The CPP managed to maintain control of key institutions such as the courts and sub-provincial authorities, whilst also keeping hold of dominant positions in the leadership of the police, gendarmerie and army ³¹. The result was an unstable government riddled with infighting and a lack of cohesive governance, which is no recipe for the kind of long term peace and stability that was desired of the UNTAC organised elections ³². UNTAC therefore, despite succeeding in organising free and fair elections, did not uphold the democratic process it had begun to install. The resulting instability and dangerous precedent for Cambodia’s future governance can thus by no means be heralded as a model for peace building after civil wars.

The political infighting between both parties involved in the coalition also had adverse effects for the adoption of a democratic constitution. UNTAC was mandated to oversee the drafting of a constitution that would comply with Annex 5 of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict ³³. Annex 5 stipulates that the constitution must be held as supreme law, must be consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, will follow a liberal democratic system on the basis of pluralism including regular elections and rights to vote, will establish and empower an independent judiciary, and finally the constitution must declare Cambodia a sovereign, independent and neutral state with recognition of the national unity of the Cambodian people ³⁴. Whilst UNTAC succeeded in overseeing the drafting of a constitution that did fulfil all the criteria of Annex 5, it failed to ensure it was ever adopted. The international assistance offered to the new Cambodian government to draft a very well meaning constitution, was never coupled with effective monitoring or follow up to ensure concrete results ³⁵. Indeed the difficult task of formulating and passing the necessary laws to ensure the constitution could be enabled was differed by the coalition government until UNTAC had withdrawn. This allowed room for political manoeuvring to manipulate positions of power outside of constitutional constraints ³⁶.

In short UNTAC succeeded in introducing the democratic principles necessary to draft a constitution but did not provide the necessary support to ensure that these principles would become enshrined in Cambodian governance and politics ³⁷. The lack of reconciliation and desire to manipulate positions of power by the parties in the fragile coalition government resulted in a lack of respect for the process of democratization, and a total absence of genuine liberalist ideals. In short democracy could not replace authoritarianism overnight ³⁸. Therefore, whilst UNTAC succeeded in ensuring the drafting of a constitution compliant with Annex 5 of the peace settlement, it failed to show the necessary commitment to ensure this was developed into a solid groundwork for long term stability and peace. A far more extensive commitment to building government cooperation and respect for democratic process was required if UNTAC was to conduct a successful peace building operation ³⁹. In the light of this failure it is hard to understand how the Cambodian Transitional Authority can be used as a model for future peace building operations after civil wars.

A further barrier to political progress and long term stability in Cambodia was the lack of effective disarmament and the withdrawal of the PDK from the elections. Under Annex 2 of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, the three main parties, mentioned previously in the historical summary, agreed to provide full details of all weapons and ammunition they held to UNTAC and surrender those arms for storage in UN secured caches ⁴⁰. This process was suspended in 1992 after the PDK renounced the ceasefire and disarmament agreements and announced a boycott of the elections, claiming it was being marginalized and forced out of the electoral process by both the international community and by FUNCINPEC and the CPP. They also claimed that the peace agreement was not being fairly upheld and that the CPP had been allowed to retain too much power in the transitional period ⁴¹. UNTAC was not prepared for non-compliance and as a result of this development failed to achieve the disarmament of the political parties detailed in Section C of its mandate ⁴². The result of the parties retaining armed force is highlighted by the 1996 report for disarmament research stating, ‘two years after UNTAC left the country, Cambodia is still suffering from chronic military clashes, and the country is not unified ⁴³â€™. The means to use violent methods of settling political disputes in Cambodia therefore still exists. Once again UNTAC, whilst introducing democratic ideas into the Cambodian system, failed to provide the necessary commitment to establish the important conditions for long term stability and peace ⁴⁴. These failures make it very hazardous to attempt to use the UNTAC experience as a model for peace building operations in post-civil war environments.

The conclusion to this analysis of UNTAC’s successes and failures therefore becomes clear, that UNTAC cannot be used as a model for peace building after civil wars. Whilst it must be acknowledged that UNTAC succeeded in organizing what can be described as free and fair elections, and the successful drafting of a constitution compliant with the stipulations outlined by the international community in the peace settlement, its failures cannot be ignored. UNTAC failed to provide important long term commitments to ensuring these efforts went on to create a stable and peaceful state. The undermining of the electoral process by the use of gun barrel diplomacy by the CPP to muscle their way into a coalition government, the lack of support to ensure the constitution was enabled and the failure to fully disarm the parties, all add to a current state of unrest and political instability in Cambodia ⁴⁵. UNTAC therefore failed to provide the necessary commitment to ensure a fully democratic, liberalist system could be implemented that would enable long term peace and stability. In short, if the UN hopes to build enduring democratic processes in war torn societies, they are going to have to be willing to do more and commit to more flexible time frames than they did in Cambodia ⁴⁶. As a result the Cambodian Transitional Authority should not be used as a model for future peace building operations after civil wars if those operations are to successfully implement political change capable of fostering enduring stability.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNTAC
The economic sphere offers a somewhat more positive account of UNTAC’s impact on Cambodia.  These successes include turning Cambodia’s centralized economic system into a market orientated one, bringing record growth to the country and providing conditions for foreign donors to assist the rebuilding project. It is important to remember however that economic improvements can only truly be judged by their impact and sustainability over time. A thorough analysis of the economic achievements of UNTAC in this way shows a far less positive picture.

The success of UNTAC in transferring Cambodia’s economy from a centralized system into a market orientated one cannot be underestimated. Until UNTAC implemented its mandate in Cambodia, which included control and regulation of its financial sector, the country had always operated under a centralized economy ⁴⁷. Its only international aid and foreign investment had come through the Eastern Bloc Council of Mutual Economic Assistance ⁴⁸. Under the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconciliation of Cambodia, UNTAC committed to launching the reconstruction programme with the view to hand the process over to the newly formed government when it took office ⁴⁹. In the short period of eighteen months that UNTAC presided over initial development projects the economy boomed and free market systems were swiftly and eagerly adopted by all political parties ⁵⁰. However to fail to look beyond initial growth and adoption of liberal market reforms is misleading. As a result of the unstable coalition government discussed earlier, the fruits of this economic boom were not cycled back into social or economic reconstruction. The failure to adopt the constitution that would have established an independent judiciary meant that no checks and balances exist in the Cambodian political system to provide transparency of government expenditure ⁵¹. The outcome is a system rife with corruption and where appropriate funds for development are waylaid into private projects and substantial pay offs to increase government power and individual wealth ⁵².

 In the period since UNTAC has withdrawn both the World Bank and the World Food programme have suspended numerous projects after uncovering theft and corruption of over seven million US dollars of donated funds. Other organisations such as a partisan USAID report from August 2004 have described ‘a pandemic of corruption’ in Cambodia ⁵³. Whilst it would be unfair to say that the high level of corruption is a result of UNTAC’s failure to ensure not only the drafting but the adoption of the constitution, it does serve as a warning of the potential dangers of installing liberal market orientated systems in countries where no concrete political system exists to regulate them ⁵⁴. As we can see from the Cambodian example, without a long term commitment to political stability, otherwise productive economic reforms can quickly become destabilising factors in and of themselves. The impact of UNTAC’s failure to establish effective political and legal safeguards in Cambodia, to ensure economic growth could be handled in a sustainable manner makes its use as a model for peace building a questionable one.

A similar situation can be found when looking into the second apparent UNTAC success for reconstructing Cambodia’s economy. In the period of UNTAC control Cambodia recorded a positive growth rate of 6 percent per annum. Despite starting from a very low base rate this is a remarkable success ⁵⁵. However this success can easily mask some serious and unsustainable budgetary weaknesses ⁵⁶. Government salaries and military expenditure have retained the dominant percentage portion of Cambodia’s annual income, despite the desperate need to invest heavily in education, health and other social sectors ⁵⁷. Indeed according to the Jane’s Sentinel Report on Cambodia, ‘in recent years, despite relatively high overall economic growth, Cambodia has experienced periodic food shortages’. The report goes on to say that ‘forty percent of the population live below the poverty line’ and attributes this to internal market instability, periodic crises and inadequate infrastructure ⁵⁸. To add to structural weaknesses, the larger proportion of economic growth has been located in cities and towns. This caused a widening of economic disparity between urban and rural areas and a growing rural poverty problem ⁵⁹. These indicators show that whilst record growth was achieved by economic reforms overseen by UNTAC, this growth has not necessarily resulted in laying the necessary groundwork for long term stability ⁶⁰. The reasons for this remain two fold, the first is the lack of government transparency and the second is the lack of cooperation between the two parties to facilitate cohesive development strategy. Greater cooperation between the two governing parties would also help to streamline government expenditure and cut down on the percentage of annual income spent on swollen militaries and civil administrations, caused by the uncoordinated merger of the two parties ⁶¹.  Once again it would be unfair to attribute the lack of sustainable budgetary spending on UNTAC, the allocation of income and prioritization of development goals has always rested with the Cambodian government ⁶². What this does show however is the destabilising factor that a lack of cohesive government poses to sustainable economic government. It is therefore reasonable to draw the conclusion that the absence of a sustained UNTAC commitment to ensuring the results of the elections were upheld, and a subsequent commitment to a programme of integration and reconciliation amongst the political parties, is by no means conducive to achieving the goal of long term peace and stability ⁶³. The failure of UNTAC to put in place the necessary foundations for stability, though not surprising given their strict timetable and limited mandate, makes it a flawed model for peace building operations after other civil conflicts.

The third area of UNTAC success that requires further scrutiny in light of Cambodia’s long term economic stability is the opening up of Cambodia to foreign donors and investment. Foreign donor investment in Cambodia grew by approximately twenty seven percent per annum in the period of 1992 to 1996, including money for both projects and services ⁶⁴. The potential development for Cambodia’s entire economy from such high levels of investment and long term growth in this sector are immeasurable. However, like the previous two positive contributions of the Transitional Authority, this too can be highly misleading. High levels of foreign donor investment in Cambodia have not necessarily amounted to long term stability and growth. A World Bank memorandum states ‘high levels of donor financing, however, helped to meet fiscal targets and masked unsustainable budgetary structural weaknesses ⁶⁵’. Whilst the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia emphasised the need to use international donor funds to build and encourage organic Cambodian economic development, instead international funds served to prop up the Cambodian economy ⁶⁶. As the memorandum goes on to state, ‘the governments own revenues financed one-third of total public expenditures, while donor assistance financed two-thirds of total public spending, all of budgetary capital spending and a part of current spending ⁶⁷’. This quote shows the extent to which the economy was indeed heavily reliant on foreign donor funding.

 The result was, and continues to be, a lack of strong economic independence that is necessary if Cambodia wishes to move beyond international support and establish itself as a stable regional economic player ⁶⁸. When foreign aid was indeed withdrawn in 1997 Cambodia’s economic growth ground to a halt ⁶⁹. The high levels of international donor assistance that UNTAC paved the way for, rather than helping to foster Cambodia’s stability and growth, has on closer examination become a crutch for corrupt and short sighted politicians ⁷⁰. Therefore what appears to be a major success for the Transitional Authority is in fact a failure to keep long term sustainable development a key priority in the handling of financial aid. It is difficult in light of this analysis to understand the viability of using the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia as a model for peace building operations in countries experiencing civil war.

Despite the initial appearance of more positive improvements from UNTAC that may present it as a good model for international peace building after civil wars, closer analysis reveals some serious flaws. The quick and willing transition of Cambodia’s economy from a centralized system to a market orientated one belies the underlying structural weakness of a lack of effective safeguards to prevent its abuse. The remarkable growth of Cambodia’s economy does not account for serious, uneven and unsustainable budgetary weaknesses caused by a lack of proper reconciliation and amalgamation of the two parties in the coalition government. Finally the lack of careful deployment and incentives to encourage organic economic development in Cambodia has resulted in one almost entirely dependent on foreign aid. Whilst a large proportion of responsibility for these shortcomings must rest with corrupt and short sighted political groups who refuse to cooperate to bring about future economic stability for their country, UNTAC’s responsibility to lay an effective political foundation without these barriers to development cannot be ignored ⁷¹. Indeed the short timetable and limited mandate of UNTAC was heavily optimistic in its attempt to achieve a fully democratic and liberal transformation of the necessary political system to afford long term economic stability. For this reason UNTAC should not be used as a model for building economic stability in other nations after civil wars.

SOCIAL IMPACT OF UNTAC
It is essential to understand the social conditions that existed in Cambodia prior to UN involvement through the United Nations Transitional Authority. The country had for the twenty year period prior to the UNTAC involvement, experienced carpet bombing, embargos, genocide, invasion, war and famine ⁷². This left the country in a situation where there was very little functioning industry, agriculture had been devastated, with virtually no functioning schools or medical facilities, and very little in terms of government or social support structures available for vulnerable groups ⁷³. The country also had little in the way of respect and understanding of human rights and protection of the individual ⁷⁴. UNTAC’s mandate sought to remedy these social weaknesses by taking control of the appropriate social sectors of government and implementing reform, education and development programmes ⁷⁵. An analysis of the extent to which UNTAC achieved these goals is an effective means of establishing its social impact, and therefore its usefulness as a model for peace building after other civil conflicts.

The first area of reform, essential to establishing the democratic and liberal background necessary for implementing a process of social development, was tackling the traditionally hierarchical and subservient culture that posed a barrier to a system where the Cambodian population felt it had a role in the functioning of state ⁷⁶. Without a change in the way Khmers interact with the state, very little pressure would be exerted by the people on the government to make social changes. Without this pressure the impetus for reform could easily be lost and create a barrier to progress in the social sector ⁷⁷. This task was recognised by the UN as an essential part of the democratization process, as shown in the effective use of classes teaching electoral processes and the role of the individual in the state that were outlined in UNTAC’s mandate ⁷⁸. The education programme did indeed succeed in raising political awareness and activism amongst the Cambodian people. However this awareness has failed to materialize into effective pressure on the government to take action and invest in social reforms. Cambodian civil society, whilst created by UNTAC, fails to have an impact on the behaviour of its government ⁷⁹.

The reason for this comes back once again to the level of corruption and political attitudes within the government itself. These problems have provided a climate where powerful elites maximise their own power, whilst very little external pressures exist to remain accountable to the people ⁸⁰. The ability of the CPP to muscle its way into power and the lack of UNTAC action to uphold the democratic principles it promoted in its education programmes, have left the people feeling that they remain with very little actual power to move beyond voicing discontent to actually enforcing change ⁸¹. Whilst UNTAC succeeded in raising awareness and hope amongst the Cambodian people for the positive social changes that democratization could bring, it failed to ensure the implementation of those very same ideals in the process of forming government ⁸². The result has been a growing sense of disaffection from the state and apathy amongst the Cambodian population towards taking the lead to enforce social progress and reform and take responsibility for changing detrimental political practice ⁸³. UNTAC’s inability to uphold the principles it promised to the Cambodian people has therefore undermined its effort to change attitudes towards democratization. This was necessary to ensure long term social reconstruction could take place ⁸⁴. It therefore failed to provide the political climate necessary to fulfil the scope of reform outlined in its mandate. As a result, to use it as a model by which to attempt similar reforms in other states emerging from civil war could lead to further failures.

Similar problems are found when looking into UNTAC’s ability to bring about human rights reforms. The need to introduce respect for human rights in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was deeply enshrined in the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict ⁸⁵. UNTAC was charged with developing and implementing a programme of education to promote respect and understanding of human rights and their importance. It was also tasked to oversee and ensure adherence to the Universal Declaration during the transitional period and ensure its principles and demands were fully incorporated into the Cambodian constitution ⁸⁶. Despite the considerable task of implementing this reform in a country that had so recently experienced genocide and civil war, UNTAC largely succeeded in its mandate. This is illustrated in the UN Secretary-Generals Report on the Situation in Cambodia, which describes far reaching and important progress in all areas of human rights ⁸⁷.

This progress is mired however by one crucial element that is missing if Cambodia is to take its Human Rights reforms forward to promote long term peace and stability. The failure of the coalition government to adopt the constitution, with its important safe guards for human rights, has meant that very little in the way of judicial oversight exists. This means that in the event of human rights complaints and misdemeanours, no independent legal process exists by which human rights principles can be upheld ⁸⁸. Instead human rights reforms are left to the discretion of the ruling parities whose record of political violence and respect for the rule of law inspires little confidence and hope for the respect of individual Cambodian’s rights. An example of political conduct given in the Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment on the situation in Cambodia cites, ‘between 2000 and 2004 the Office of Human Rights in Cambodia recorded 43 murders of political activists, thought to have been perpetrated with political motives ⁸⁹’. This shows that long term respect for Human Rights was not achieved, and the impact that an absence of an effective judiciary has had for the development of the rights of the people ⁹⁰. Failure to ensure the constitution’s provisions were properly enabled comes back once again to the lack of commitment of UNTAC to upholding the processes it began in a long term commitment. The short mandate and lack of post election support for the new government, whilst not entirely responsible for an absence of respect for Human Rights, has contributed to the undermining of initial progress in this area ⁹¹. In light of the results of this scrutiny of UNTAC’s ability to provide long term support for building respect and compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights within Cambodia, it is difficult to see how it can be positively used to build peace in other countries after civil war.

One area however where it is difficult to fault UNTAC is its success in establishing demining initiatives and raising awareness of the dangers of unexploded ordinance. Cambodia is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world and has an estimated contaminated area of two thousand nine hundred kilometres as a result ⁹². The impact of these mines on Cambodian society is staggering. Cambodia has the highest number of amputees per capita than any other nation in the world. Handicapped victims of landmines number over three hundred and fifty thousand. This represents an extremely large vulnerable group that are often dependant on state support, NGO’s or street crime and begging for survival ⁹³. In accordance with the concerns raised in Security Council Resolution 728 UNTAC took ground breaking steps to address the landmine and unexploded ordinance problem ⁹⁴. It provided extensive assistance ‘in clearing mines and undertaking training programmes in mine clearance and mine awareness among the Cambodian people’ in accordance with Section C of its mandate ⁹⁵. Whilst mines and unexploded ordinance continue to cause social burdens on the Cambodian state, the UNTAC initiative paved the way for important organisations such as the Halo trust and Mine Action Group to become involved in Cambodian mine clearance and pave the way for progress ⁹⁶. UNTAC therefore represents a good example to be carried forward, of how to deal with countries whose period of civil war has resulted in indiscriminate and extensive use of landmines and explosive ordinance.

Unfortunately not all areas of social reconstruction have benefitted from UNTAC’s presence in Cambodia. Inevitably the conservative and heavily traditional society of Cambodia did not always benefit from the presence of foreign cultures and practices in its country ⁹⁷. A prime example of the clash of cultures can be well demonstrated by the incidence of prostitution and child trafficking for sex in Cambodia. The crime of trafficking and participation in the sex industry was virtually unknown in Cambodia until the 1990’s according to the Post-Yokohama Mid-Term Review of the East Asia and the Pacific Regional Commitment and Action Plan Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children ⁹⁸. The report goes on to state that the sudden boom in these activities can be attributed to the arrival of hundreds of UNTAC staff in Cambodia. Indeed the report states the number of sex workers in the capital Phnom Penh, estimated at twenty thousand in 1992, of which up to a third were aged below seventeen, was nearly cut in half after the departure of UNTAC ⁹⁹. The impact of a boom in this industry on Cambodian society has been to introduce an illegal underworld of human trade ¹⁰⁰. Unfortunately in light of this evidence it becomes apparent that the UN did not place enough importance on designing a culturally appropriate peace building force, or in promoting culturally sensitive conduct by its personnel ¹⁰¹. As a result it is very difficult to advocate the transference of UNTAC’s social impact onto other states that are emerging from civil war by using it as a model for peace building.

This investigation into the social implications of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia highlights some considerable barriers to its use as a peace building model. UNTAC’s failure to uphold democratic processes by demonstrating the commitment to ensure the May 1993 election results were upheld, has led to disaffection and apathy amongst the Cambodian people to pursue active involvement in the state in order to effect social change. This lack of commitment has also led to the failure of the Transitional Authority to ensure the implementation of the constitution to ensure the Human Rights provisions within it are upheld by the government ¹⁰². Therefore despite the initial success of raising democratic awareness and developing Human Rights safeguards, UNTAC’s example in these areas cannot be followed as a model for peace building operations. Furthermore, whilst the success of UNTAC’s efforts to tackle the ongoing and serious problem of landmines and unexploded ordinance must not be ignored, the failure of the UN to ensure that its efforts and personnel remained culturally sensitive had detrimental knock on effects that only served to create social problems where others began to be resolved ¹⁰³. To transfer these problems onto another state attempting to recover from civil war by following the UNTAC experience as a model, would be to invite failure and further criticism.

REGIONAL IMPACT OF UNTAC
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia was mandated to ensure the adoption of all agreements contained in the Paris accords, including the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia ¹⁰⁴. These agreements established Cambodia as a Sovereign entity in the South East Asian region, bringing an end to twenty years of war and genocide that had represented a worrying and potentially destabilising influence to its neighbours ¹⁰⁵. The progress of UNTAC in building confidence amongst regional powers and the international community can be seen in the rapid and immediate investment of foreign donors in the Cambodian economy ¹⁰⁶. UNTAC therefore fulfilled its commitments to ensuring the regional and international aspects of the Paris Peace Accords were implemented ¹⁰⁷.

 Whilst the UN Transitional Authority’s success in this area is a considerable achievement in light of Cambodia’s anarchic state of civil war only months before, it should not be adopted as a model for future peace building operations without further analysis. This is because a series of destabilizing and worrying trends have emerged concerning Cambodia’s impact on regional stability as a result of the lack of effective judicial oversight and endemic political corruption ¹⁰⁸.

The first of these destabilizing factors is the prevalence of a booming drugs trade that thrives in the lack of strong government legal opposition ¹⁰⁹. Cambodia has for many years lain at the heart of the ‘Golden Triangle’ as regards to drug production and has long been a transit point for these drugs to filter into international markets ¹¹⁰. The drugs trade in Cambodia is not simply the responsibility of a few organized crime rackets however, the money and protection behind its rapid growth rests with high ranking corrupt political officials and the financial sector.

A confidential report by the Interior Ministry revealed that nineteen of the twenty nine new banks in Phnom Penh were fronts for money laundering campaigns operating off profits from illicit trade in drugs. Coupled to this have been numerous reports of disputes between various government and police agencies over the control and trafficking of drugs ¹¹¹. Both these reports show the effect of Cambodia’s corrupt leadership and the lack of effective legal mechanisms on an issue of great regional and international importance ¹¹². Whilst this problem undoubtedly existed prior to UNTAC involvement in the country, the failure to implement long term support for the government to ensure the full adoption of the constitution, that would have enabled an independent judiciary capable of making some headway into limiting the problem, is clear. This lack of commitment has had clear knock on effects for both Cambodia’s neighbours and the rest of the international community ¹¹³. As a result it would be unwise to use UNTAC as a model for peace building in post civil war societies where a significant or potential drugs trade could emerge.

The emergence of a growing problem of human trafficking in Cambodia also has important and serious regional effects. As previously touched upon in an analysis of the social impact of UNTAC, the introduction of UN personnel in Cambodia has introduced a considerable prostitution problem into Cambodian society ¹¹⁴.  The trade in women and young girls for sex has grown beyond Cambodia itself however. Cambodia has become a major transit point for human trafficking in the South East Asian region. Women and children are frequently trafficked from Vietnam into Cambodia, and both Vietnamese and Cambodian sex workers are regularly transferred into Thailand in large numbers ¹¹⁵. Whilst there have been some arrests made by the Cambodian police, its anti-trafficking attempts have been greatly hampered by the country’s corrupt and weak legal system ¹¹⁶. Once again the failure of the government to effectively establish an independent judiciary and respect for the rule of law amongst Cambodian officials, has an important effect on not just on Cambodian stability but also regional security ¹¹⁷.

The conduct of government politicians and high ranking officials cannot be blamed on UNTAC. However the failure of UNTAC to display the necessary commitment to not only introducing democratic principles and a liberal constitution, but also to ensure that these efforts resulted in long term reform, has resulted in a government system unable to prevent the growth of crime and its expansion beyond its own borders to effect regional stability. As a result it is difficult to advocate the use of UNTAC as a model for peace building, where its lack of commitment to long term support and promotion of good governance, may cause similar regional problems in other parts of the world.

The final area of concern for regional stability that has emerged out of Cambodia’s lack of judicial process and corruption is the exploitation and unsustainable use of its resources for quick profit and private wealth. The most serious exploitation has occurred in the alarming deforestation of Cambodia’s forests ¹¹⁸. In the early seventies approximately seventy percent of Cambodia’s land was covered in dense forest. By 1998 this had dropped to an estimated thirty five percent. These alarming figures can be attributed to corruption and the lack of legal protection for environmental resources that exists within the Cambodian government ¹¹⁹. Again it is unfair to say that UNTAC is solely responsible for the unchecked and indiscriminate logging of Cambodia’s forest. What it is responsible for however, is the lack of a long term commitment to ensuring the coalition government acted in accordance with the safeguards and stipulations of good governance outlined in the Paris Peace Accords ¹²⁰. It therefore should not be transferred as a model to other countries that require peace building efforts after civil war.

From an analysis of the three regional and international problems that have been created by weak judicial systems and the pandemic corruption within the Cambodian government, the consequences of UNTAC’s lack of sustained commitment to ensuring that liberal and democratic processes were properly enabled, become clear. It is neither fair nor accurate to say that UNTAC was directly responsible for a booming drugs industry, human trafficking and exploitation of Cambodia’s resources. It is responsible for the failure to lay the appropriate foundations to help prevent the practice of corruption and a lack of respect for the rule of law becoming endemic. Thus it is not a good model to follow if genuine and long term peace building is to be achieved.

Almost a decade ago, STRs were popular markers used by molecular biologists to screen single gene disorders (monogenic) because of its even distribution across the human genome, suited for linkage studies used to identify the responsible gene and smooth sailing PCR (Gray et al. 2000 and Dove. 2007). Gradually, the need to research complex disorders, such as, diabetes, cancer, etc, has switched the favour back to SNPs. Further, the growing interest within the community to research drug responses has also fuelled the urge to utilise SNPs. The focal reason being SNPs have been reported (Gray et al. 2000) to have low mutation occurrences, thus, a strong tool in medical diagnostics and research.

Such is the ever gaining popularity of SNPs, that a world – wide debate sparked involving the number of SNPs required for whole – genome research. The number reportedly fell from a million to 300,000 (Lai et al. 2002). The scientific community is heavily voting for cementing haplotype maps to boost information and cutting down the quantity of SNPs for whole – genome mapping (Uppsala Universitet. Molecular Medicine).

Haplotype based SNP maps will benefit pharmacogenetics in performing comparatively less expensive clinical trials and an effective drug market with ready availability of medicines for individuals in acute risk (Lai et al. 2002).

Sequence repeats are of huge importance as it offers genomic landmark to medical genetics. It has fuelled heavy weight research because of its importance as genetic markers in mapping genes in a successful venture to understand hereditary diseases.

Conclusion
What has been made clear by this study is that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia cannot be used as a model for building peace after civil wars. Where the international community uses the Cambodian experience to attempt to create a ‘mainstreamed’ method by which to establish long term peace and stability after civil wars, the attempts will experience much the same pitfalls as in Cambodia. Any attempts at peace building must, by definition, create an environment and conditions from which economic, social, political and international stability can be born. UNTAC is shown in this study to have failed to ensure that this important framework was established.

This is not to say that the lessons of UNTAC must be thrown out as a base from which to draw other peace building mandates. Also highlighted in the analysis of this argument are numerous and important successes that should be carried forward and offer valuable lessons for future attempts at establishing transitional authorities. Perhaps the most important of these lessons is a unified will amongst the international community to commit to an attempt at building peace in the first place. This is a lesson that unfortunately has often been ignored, where the international community has failed to act to assist another nation that lacks the ability to create a purely domestic resolution to conflict ¹²¹. Other lessons include the transformation of the battle field into an environment where disputes can be handled by diplomacy, and the successful resolution of the conflict through free and fair elections ¹²². UNTAC also paved the way for an influx of foreign donors into Cambodia that gave the country important and much needed funds to begin development ¹²³. The success of the Transitional Authority at introducing liberal democratic ideas and human rights awareness to the Cambodian people through its education programmes, offers a good example of how to change perceptions and raise expectations amongst a population ¹²⁴. The same can be said of education programmes covering the dangers of landmines and the introduction of schemes to begin demining, in countries that have a high incidence of these weapons ¹²⁵. It would therefore be unfair and misleading to say that nothing from the Cambodian lesson should be transferred into attempts to conduct peace building operations elsewhere.

This is not to say however that it can be used as a model. UNTAC failed to take these successes further and display the necessary commitment required if the newly elected Cambodian government was to become a strong and stable provider that upheld rule of law and constitutional ideals. The manifestations of this failure have displayed themselves in a lack of democratic political processes. Instead the Cambodian government is corrupt, fails to uphold democratic processes and operates above the law ¹²⁶.  As a result Cambodia’s constitution that promised the Cambodian people access to human rights, participation in government and a departure from the oppressive and violent behaviour of the past, has never been enabled ¹²⁷. As shown in the previous argument, the rot in Cambodia’s governance that set in immediately after elections, when the CPP was not prevented by UNTAC from using gun barrel diplomacy to muscle its way into power, has led to many subsequent problems in both Cambodia and the South East Asian region. Corrupt practices and an absence of the rule of law has caused widespread economic problems including a lack of investment in the social sector, an absence of sustainable budget management and few incentives to promote organic economic growth. The impact goes further, beyond purely economic failures, to a lack of respect for human rights, a booming drugs and human trafficking industry and irresponsible exploitation of the countries natural resources.  It is therefore clear from these conclusions that UNTAC did not go far enough to ensure the democratic processes and liberal ideals it introduced to Cambodia resulted in the creation of a government that could carry them forward to create long term stability and peace. To add to this crucial failure is the conclusion that the Transitional Authority did not remain culturally and socially conscious of its conduct whilst establishing a new government system in a heavily traditional and conservative culture. The alarming results of this further failure have been the introduction of a criminal underworld providing prostitution of women and children for foreign employees.

Upon a thorough and detailed analysis of UNTAC and its impact on Cambodia’s political, economic, social and regional stability, it becomes clear that to follow it as a model would be to invite failure. The lack of a long term commitment to ensuring that liberal and democratic reforms were carried through into the country’s first government, lies at the heart of its current failings. Had UNTAC wanted to ensure that it created a stable state along liberal Wilsonian principles, it needed a far more extensive mandate with more realistic and flexible timetables, given the absence of these principles in Cambodian history or culture. UNTAC also required a greater understanding of the country’s background and social norms to ensure its goals were both achievable and sensitive to what a Cambodian, rather than a western democracy may look like. Indeed it is these lessons for future peace building operations that should be taken forward, rather than attempting to transfer the entire experience of UNTAC into another environment where it may make the same mistakes. Given the prevalence of armed conflict and a growing number of attempts to build new governments with international assistance in the world today, a thorough and in depth understanding of the UNTAC experience could well be of use.

Further conclusions state that with respect to PND, microsatellite typing should be used to assist CYP21 genotyping to avoid any irregularities with mutation (Day et al. 1996).

Bibliography

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http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/facts.htm

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¹ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, pg 215- 222
² Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, pg 221- 222
³ UN Security Council Resolution 668, 718 & 717
⁴ Berdal & Leifer, pg 25- 59
⁵ Peou, pp 263- 306
⁶ Wallensteen, pg 134- 135
⁷ 1996 Report for Disarmament Research, pp 10- 12
⁸ The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Part One, Annex 1, Section B
⁹ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, pg 64- 65
¹⁰ http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission
¹¹ Berdal & Leifer, pp 32- 34
¹² Chandler, pp 12- 15
¹³ Chandler, pg 12
¹⁴ Chandler, pp 12- 15
¹⁵ Ashley, pg 20
¹⁶ Chandler, pp 16- 17
¹⁷ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
¹⁸ Berdal & Leifer, pp 28-29
¹⁹ Berdal & Leifer, pg 34
²⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 718
²¹ Chandler, pp 15- 17
²³ 1996 Report for Disarmament Research, pp 83- 88
²⁴ The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Part One, Annex 1, Section B
²⁵ The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Part One, Annex 1, Sections A & B
²⁶ Hendrickson, pg 8
²⁷ Tennant, pg 53
²⁸ Hendrikson, pp 6- 8
²⁹ Ashley, pp 24- 26
³⁰ Hendrickson, Pg 44
³¹ Ashley, pp 24- 25
³² Mong Hay, pg 38
³³ The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Part One, Article 12 & 23
³⁴ The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex  5
³⁵ Chhay, pg 65
³⁶ Chhay, pg 65
³⁷ Peou, pp 298- 268
³⁸ Peou, pg 298
³⁹ Seanglim, pg 69
⁴⁰ The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 2, Articles 3- 6
⁴¹ Ashley, pp 22- 23
⁴² The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1, Section C, Articles 2- 3
⁴³ 1996 Report for Disarmament Research, pg 83
⁴⁴ 1996 Report for Disarmament Research, pp 87- 88
⁴⁵ Ashley, pp 24- 29
⁴⁶ Peou, pg 298
⁴⁷ The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1, Section B, Article 1
⁴⁸ Tith, pg 1
⁴⁹ Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, Articles 9- 11
⁵⁰ Peou, pg 298
⁵¹ Seanglim, pg 69
⁵² Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 4 
⁵³ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pp 3- 4 
⁵⁴ Seanglim, pg 69
⁵⁵ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
⁵⁶ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
⁵⁷ Tith, pp 6- 7
⁵⁸ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 7
⁵⁹ Tith, pp7- 8
⁶⁰ Mong Hay, pp 36- 40
⁶¹ Mong Hay, pp 36- 40
⁶² Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, Article 2
⁶³ Ashley, pg  29
⁶⁴ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
⁶⁵ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
⁶⁶ Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, Article 11
⁶⁷ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
⁶⁸ Seanglim, pg 69
⁶⁹ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
⁷⁰ Seanglim, pg 69
⁷¹ Hendrickson, pp 5- 20
⁷² Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
⁷³ Tith, pg 4
⁷⁴ Report of the Secretary-General, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to the Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, Situation in Cambodia Report, UN Economic and Social Council, pp 1- 9
⁷⁵ The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1
⁷⁶ Chhay, pg 65
⁷⁷ Yiheang, pg 47
⁷⁸ Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1, Article 3
⁷⁹ Mong Hay, pg 44
⁸⁰ Yiheang, pg 47
⁸¹ Ashley, pg 61
⁸² Mon Hay, pg 44
⁸³ Seanglim, pg 69
⁸⁴ Ashley, pg 61
⁸⁵ Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Part 3
⁸⁶ Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1, Section E
⁸⁷ Report of the Secretary-General, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to the Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, Situation in Cambodia Report, UN Economc and Social Council, pp 10- 63
⁸⁸ Bory, pg 49
⁸⁹ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 3
⁹⁰ Mong Hay, pp 40- 44
⁹¹ Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Michael Kirby, on the situation of Human Rights in Cambodia submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/6, UN Economic and Social Council, 1994, Article 12
⁹² Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 5
⁹³ Tith, pg 2
⁹⁴ Security Council Resolution 728
⁹⁵ Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Annex 1, Section C
⁹⁶ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 7
⁹⁷ Mead, pg 57
⁹⁸ Post-Yokohama Mid-Term Review of the East Asia and the Pacific Regional Commitment and Action Plan Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, pg 2
⁹⁹ Post-Yokohama Mid-Term Review of the East Asia and the Pacific Regional Commitment and Action Plan Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, pp 2- 3
¹⁰⁰ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pp 10- 11
¹⁰¹ Mead, pg 57
¹⁰² Tennant, pg 53
¹⁰³ Mead, pg 57
¹⁰⁴ Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Part One, Article 6
¹⁰⁵ Mong Hay, pp 40- 44
¹⁰⁶ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
¹⁰⁷ Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia
¹⁰⁸ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pp 3- 4 
¹⁰⁹ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 10
¹¹⁰ Lintner, pg 1
¹¹¹ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 10
¹¹² Lintner, pg 1
¹¹³ Lintner, pg 1
¹¹⁴ Post-Yokohama Mid-Term Review of the East Asia and the Pacific Regional Commitment and Action Plan Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, pg 2
¹¹⁵ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 10
¹¹⁶ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 10
¹¹⁷ Lintner, pg 1
¹¹⁸ Tith, pp 3- 4
¹¹⁹ Tith, pg 3
¹²⁰ The Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, Articles 1- 15
¹²¹ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, pp 132- 153
¹²² 1996 Report for Disarmament Research, pp 11- 13
¹²³ Memorandum to the Executive Directors and the President, Office of the Director-General Operations Evaluation, The World Bank, 20433
¹²⁴ Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Michael Kirby, on the situation of Human Rights in Cambodia submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/6, UN Economic and Social Council, 1994, Article 2
¹²⁵ Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment- Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Security Section, pg 5
¹²⁶ Tennant, pg 53
¹²⁷ Peou, pp 87- 88